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A US Clean Energy Transition and the Trump Administration 
 
Executive Summary 
The Obama administration undertook several steps giving the US federal 
government a leadership role in a clean energy transition. Among other actions, 
the administration develop a Climate Action Plan, successfully negotiated higher 
fuel vehicle standards with car manufacturers, passed the Clean Power Plan, and 
signed the Paris Climate Agreement. Although the United States had been party to 
other international climate agreements and was a signatory to the Rio Declaration, 
other federal efforts were lax at best.  
During his election campaign, Donald Trump promised his supporters to 
eliminate the Clean Power Plan, withdraw from the Paris Agreement, curtail the 
Environmental Protection Agency, bring back coal jobs, promote fossil fuels, and 
reduce environmental restrictions among other efforts. All of these actions are 
significant and nullify a federal leadership role in a clean energy transition. 
Regardless of the significance of these actions and the withdrawal of federal 
leadership, a clean energy transition is and will continue to take place for two 
important and, at this time, irreversible reasons. First, private sector investments 
continue to be made, new utility business models are developing, and new energy 
technologies and new energy markets are opening. Second, state regulators play 
an active role in supporting private sector activities pushing forward with a clean 
energy transition. This paper will briefly discuss private sector initiatives and then 
address, in detail, the role that state regulators play encouraging investment in 
clean power and in nudging the development of new utility business models. 
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Introduction 
 On November 8, 2017, the world was shocked at the news that Donald Trump was elected 
president of the United States. As a candidate, he arrogantly rejected the reality of climate change 
alleging that it was a “Chinese hoax.”1 Additionally, he threatened to terminate President Obama’s 
Clean Power Plan, immediately withdraw from the Paris agreement,2 and incapacitate the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Further, once elected, his nominee for the EPA was a 
man with close ties to the oil and gas industry and, once in office, he proceeded to install a number 
of climate skeptics to high administrative positions.3 Additionally, Trump nominated, Rick Perry, 
a former Texas governor, to head the Department of Energy, an agency that Perry vowed to close 
if elected president.4 Clearly, all signals from the administration have been to roll back any climate 
actions initiated by his predecessor.  
 Once in office, President Trump began to make good on his campaign promises regarding 
such things as immigration, health care, building a wall between the United States and Mexico, 
and, most drastically, signing executive orders to reduce the reach of regulation. Curiously, 
however, as of this writing, he has taken no action to extract the United States from Paris 
agreement. Regarding the Clean Power Plan, however, those actions will take place in the EPA 
and Trump’s proposed 2017 budget is aimed at crippling the science departments at the agency 
and reducing the its budget by 25%.5  
                                                   
1 Edward Wong, Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax.  Bejing Says It is Anything But,. N.Y. TIMES 
(November 18, 2917) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trump-climate-
change.html?_r=0.  
2 Chelsea Harvey, Trump Has Vowed to Kill the Clean Power Plan.  Here’s How He Might – and Might not – 
Succeed, WASH. POST (November 11, 2016) available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2016/11/11/trump-has-vowed-to-kill-the-clean-power-plan-heres-how-he-might-and-might-not-
succeed/?utm_term=.33acc57d88d6; Brandon Storm, Can President Trump Kill the Clean Power Plan and the Paris 
Agreement? LAWFARE (November 17, 2017) available at  https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-president-trump-kill-
clean-power-plan-and-paris-agreement.  
3 Brady Dennis & Steven Mufson, Thousands of Emails Detail EPA Head’s Close Ties to Fossil Fuel Industry, 
WASH. POST (February 22, 2017) available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/02/22/oklahoma-attorney-generals-office-releases-7500-pages-of-emails-between-scott-
pruitt-and-fossil-fuel-industry/?utm_term=.9be753b3235f; Coral Davenport, New Administrator Stacks E.P. A. with 
Climate Change Skeptics,  N.Y. TIMES A17 (March 8, 2017); 
4 Coral Davenport, Rick Perry Regrets Call to Close Energy Department, N.Y. TIMES (January 19, 2017) available 
at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/politics/rick-perry-energy-department.html.  
5 Alex Guillen, Sources: White House Proposes to Cut EPA Budget by Quarter, POLITICO (February 27, 2017) 
available at http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/epa-environment-trump-budget-235466;  Warren Cornwall, 
Trump Plan for 40% Cut Could Cause EPA Science Office “to Implode,” Official Warns, SCIENCE (March 3, 2017) 
available at  http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/03/trump-plan-40-cut-could-cause-epa-science-office-implode-
official-warns; Alan RAppeport & Glenn Thrush, Trump Budget Seeks Sharp Cuts in E.P.A. and State Dept., N.Y. 
TIMES (March 16, 2017) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/16/us/politics/trump-budget-spending-
cuts.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=a-lede-package-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0.   
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 Regarding the environment, one message is very clear. The federal government has no 
intention of taking an active, leadership role in a clean energy transition. This paper argues that a 
failure to do so is unfortunate but not fatal. The failure of federal leadership may slow momentum 
of a clean energy transition; it will not destroy it. Instead, clean energy activities at the regional, 
local, and state levels as well as private sector investments demonstrate the necessity, and quite 
frankly inevitability, of a clean energy transition. This paper will briefly discuss the role of private 
sector investments and the development of new business models. For both of those private sector 
activities to contribute to a clean energy transition, public regulation is the linchpin between private 
finance and the redesigned and modernized electric industry. This paper, then, will mostly address 
the role of state regulators in advancing the transition.6 
 
I. Clean Energy Investments  
The Paris conference emphasized the need for continued investment in 
energy/environmental innovations.  Of central concern to the success of the Paris talks was the 
necessity for financial commitments to address both adaptation and mitigation measures.  A 
successful clean energy transition depended upon public-private cooperation and industry–
regulator participation.7  Significantly, a group of more than 20 billionaires announced the 
formation of a multi-billion dollar fund named the Breakthrough Energy Coalition8 to create a 
new, clean energy mix for the future.  The Coalition will work together with a group of countries 
through a project known as the Mission Initiative to accelerate the clean energy revolution.9 
As importantly, the need for investments in clean power is now being recognized in the 
marketplace as financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs, Citi and Bank of America also 
announce multi-billion dollar investment commitments10 in a clean energy market that is currently 
estimated to be worth more than one-half trillion dollars.11  More particularly, innovation and 
investment must take place along three dimensions – in technologies and new markets, in business 
practices, and in the regulations that monitor both the energy and the environmental sectors of our 
economy. This section of the paper briefly addresses public and private financing for new 
                                                   
6 This paper is based in part on the recently published JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, CLEAN POWER POLITICS: THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF ENERGY (2017 Cambridge University Press). 
7 Clifford Krauss & Keith Bradsher, Climate Deal is Signal. To Industry: The Era of Carbon Reduction is Here, 
N.Y. TIMES (December 13, 2015); Andrew C. Revkin, The Climate Path Ahead, SUNDAY REVIEW: N.Y. TIMES  
(December 12, 2015). 
8 Breakthrough Energy Coalition homepage at http://www.breakthroughenergycoalition.com/en/index.html.  
9 Mission Initiative homepage at http://mission-innovation.net/.  
10 Babara Grady, Banks Shift Billions and Billions into Clean Energy, GREENBIZ (November 19, 2015). 
11 Goldman Sachs GS Sustain, The Low Carbon Economy: Key Takeaways from the Paris Agreement (December 
14, 2015). 
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technologies and new energy markets. The following section examines new business practices and 
models followed by a more detailed discussion of innovative regulatory initiatives. 
A. Private Finance 
 Clean energy investing is both necessary and strong.  The need for clean energy 
investments is palpable. It has recently been estimated, for example, that in order to fully combat 
climate change, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% from 2005 levels by 2035, that a 
$200 billion annual investment of both public and private resources will be needed.  While 
significant, $200 billion is equal to about 1.2% of GDP and about 6.5% of total US investment for 
2012.12  
 As important, declining costs for clean energy show positive investment signals.  In the 
solar and wind sectors, as examples, costs are declining precipitously. The cost of wind energy is 
down from a range of $101-$169 per MWh in 2009 to $32-$62 per MWh in 2016 – a 66% decline.  
Utility-scale solar costs have fallen 85% from a 2009 range of $323-$394 per MWh to $49-$61 
per MWh in 2016. Importantly, renewable resources are cost competitive and are reaching grid 
parity.13   Grid parity, of course, is the holy grail of clean energy investments. 
Energy investments in the United States and globally have been on the rise in absolute 
terms and they have outpaced other types of investments in relative terms even during the Great 
Recession of 2008-2012.  In 2013, the Americas spent $66 billion on clean energy investments 
down from a high of $88 billion in 2011 and down from $71 billion spent in 201214 while during 
the period the United States spent $33.9 billion in renewable energy.15 New investment records 
were set in 2015 as global investment in renewables rose 5% from the previous year to $285.9 
billion. This exceeded the previous 2011 benchmark of $278.5 billion. The 2015 total was in excess 
of six times the amount invested 2004. Over the last 12 years, then, total investment has reached 
$2.3 trillion. Most impressively, renewable resources including hydropower, solar, and wind 
power represent more new installed capacity and any other resource.16  Also during the period, 
                                                   
12 ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., GREEN GROWTH: A U.S. PROGRAM FOR CONTROLLING CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
EXPANDING JOB OPPORTUNITIES 242 (September 2014) (a report for the Center for American Progress and the 
Political Economy Research institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst); see also JEFFREY D. SACHS, 
BUILDING THE NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY: SMART, FAIR & SUSTAINABLE ch. 9 (2017). 
13 LAZARD, LAZARD’S LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS -- VERSION 10.0 (December 2016) available at 
https://www.lazard.com/media/438038/levelized-cost-of-energy-v100.pdf;  World Economic Forum, Renewable 
Infrastructure Investment Handbook: A Guide for Institutional Investors (December 2016) available at   
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Renewable_Infrastructure_Investment_Handbook.pdf.  
14 Luke Mills, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Global Trends in Clean Energy Investment 5(July 2014) 5. 
15 FRANKFURT SCHOOL-UNEP COLLABORATING CENTRE FOR CLIMATE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FINANCE & 
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2014 23 (2014). 
23. [Hereinafter FRANKFURT SCHOOL 2014]. 
16 FRANKFURT SCHOOL-UNEP COLLABORATING CENTRE FOR CLIMATE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FINANCE & 
BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT 2016 Executive 
Summary (2016). [Hereinafter FRANKFURT SCHOOL 2016]. 
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VC/PE investments showed a similar trend in 2015, venture capital investment was $3.4 billion a 
34% increase over the previous year and the second year of success of growth.17  
 There are, however, persistent problems regarding clean energy investments that must be 
acknowledged. First, climate change is not amenable to a quick fix. Long time horizons exist not 
only for investment profiles but also to determine return on investment. Consequently, clean 
energy presents a certain level of risk. Second, because of the long time horizons and the short-
term focus on quarterly returns, long-run costs (and returns) are difficult to predict and assess.  
Further, the costs of human suffering, refugee migration, climate degradation,18 and the like, as 
well as regulatory signals, contribute to investment risk and, therefore, are likely to result in under 
investment in the sector. Nevertheless, the investment climate is increasingly attractive to venture 
capitalists and private equity firms (VC/PE) as well as commercial lenders.   
While VC/PE firms do get involved in energy innovation, they tend to be get involved after 
the technology has been fully proven and marketability is on the near horizon.19  In 2013, for 
example, VC/PE investment invested over two thirds of its capital in wind and solar projects, 
which are both proven technologies20 although in 2014 there were signals that VC/PE was 
reentering clean energy investing.21  
Commercial banks such as Citigroup or Deutsche Bank are becoming more actively 
involved in developing their green investment portfolios.  Deutsche Bank, for example, offers an 
array of banking services to support an energy transition.  Recently, they have reported that as a 
financial intermediary they have been involved in $1.23 billion of large-scale renewable energy 
projects in 2013 and that they manage assets that are sensitive to environmental goals of 
approximately $7 billion.  The bank has adopted an energy and climate strategy that includes the 
development of sustainable products, carbon neutrality, and green building investments as well as 
clean energy technology innovations.22 
                                                   
17 FRANKFURT SCHOOL 2016 at Ch. 5. 
18 See e.g. Timmons Roberts & Caroline Jones, American Soft Power, the Paris Agreement, and Climate Finance 
Under Trump, BROOKINGS PLANET POLICY (February 24, 2017) available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2017/02/24/american-soft-power-the-paris-agreement-and-climate-
finance-under-trump/; World Economic Forum, Renewable Infrastructure Investment Handbook: A Guide for 
Institutional Investors (December 2016) available at   
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Renewable_Infrastructure_Investment_Handbook.pdf.  
19 BENJAMIN GADDY, VARUN SIVARAM & FRANCIS O’SULLIVAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND CLEAN TECH: THE 
WRONG MODEL FOR CLEAN ENERGY INNOVATION (July 2016) available at https://energy.mit.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/MITEI-WP-2016-06.pdf;  NEIL E.HARRISON & JOHN MIKLER (EDS.), CLIMATE 
INNOVATION: LIBERAL CAPITALISM AND CLIMATE Change 25-28 (2014). 
20 FRANKFURT SCHOOL 2014 at 17and Ch. 8. 
21 Hiroko Tabuchi, Venture Capitalists Return to Backing Science Start-Ups, N.Y. TIMES (October 12, 2014) 
(reporting VC investments of $1.24 billion for industrial and energy start-ups in the first half of 2014  which was 
below the 2008 peak of $4.46 billion for those two sectors). 
22 Deutsche Bank, Energy and Climate Strategy: Supporting the Transition to Sustainable Growth available at 
https://www.db.com/cr/en/environment/energy-and-climate-strategy.htm.  
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 In 2009, Citi Group created its Citi Climate Change Universe to assess how to satisfy global 
energy needs. Citi estimated that global GDP was expected to quadruple over the next 50 years 
and to do so would require $37 trillion investment in energy needs. Of that $37 trillion, $24 trillion 
is forecast to be satisfied by clean energy sector including natural gas. Citi also estimated that $6 
trillion will be required for renewable power generation alone.23   
 As a final example of commercial and investment banking activity, in April 2014, J.P. 
Morgan Chase & Co. published its Environmental and Social Policy Framework (E&S).  The idea 
behind Morgan’s E&S policy is to look at environmental and human rights issues for the express 
purpose of identifying risks to investments as well as exhibiting corporate responsibility.  Morgan 
has adopted a series of best practices that are used to measure a transaction against its E&S policy. 
For example, hydraulic fracturing, oil sands development, and exploration in the Arctic all require 
enhanced risk review by the bank. In the electric sector, coal-fired power generation must be 
measured against greenhouse gas impacts and other pollution controls before a recommendation 
for investment will be made.  Note that Morgan is, and has been, heavily involved in the fossil fuel 
sector.  According to its E&S policy, however, it takes the IPCC’s assessment of the impact of 
carbon dioxide on climate change seriously and incorporates it into its portfolio review process.24 
B. Public Finance 
 The energy sector operates in a heavily regulated environment.  To the point, the clean 
energy transition is currently dependent on state policies and regulations that either lower the cost 
of clean energy or remove barriers for its adaptation and adoption.25 Consequently, the sector 
benefits from a wide array of financial incentives and supports not the least of which involve the 
government support of the development of innovative clean energy technologies.  
The Department of Energy under the Obama administration shifted billions of R & D 
dollars from defense energy projects to non-defense energy projects.  The centerpiece of the 
Obama administration was the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).26 
Notably, as a result of ARRA in 2009, $90 billion was directed towards clean energy related 
investments while leveraging approximately $150 billion in private and other non-federal capital 
for clean energy investments.27 More significantly, the Council of economic advisers estimated 
                                                   
23 Citi, Citi Climate Change Universe 1 (March 2013). 
24 JP Morgan Chase & Co., Environmental and Social Policy Framework (April 2014) available at  
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/Corporate-Responsibility/driving_sustainability_through_business.htm.  
25 RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE CLEAN ENERGY PROCUREMENT INDEX: STATE 
LEADERSHIP & RANKINGS (January 2017) available at https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/f9040bd1-7681-455a-9a64-
5a518c16551d.pdf.  
26 American Recover and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 115. 
27 White House, FACT SHEET: The Recovery Act Made the Largest Single Investment in Clean Energy in History, 
Driving the Deployment of Clean Energy, Promoting Energy Efficiency, and Supporting Manufacturing (February 
25, 2016) available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-recovery-act-
made-largest-single-investment-clean-energy.  
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that the ARRA lifted GDP 2 to 3% above where would have been in created over 6 million full-
time jobs roughly 900,000 of which were in the clean energy sector. 
Significantly, from 2008 2016, solar electricity generation increased 30-fold. Wind 
generation during the same time increase over three-fold. ARRA funding affected a variety of 
clean energy technologies including advanced vehicles, storage, and energy efficiency among 
others.  Additionally, the funding affected deployment of smart meters, advanced manufacturing, 
and weatherized more than 800,000 homes.28 
Most importantly, clean energy R & D follows a distinctly different configuration than 
traditional R&D. Historically, federal R&D, the Manhattan Project and Project Apollo are the 
paradigmatic examples, were focused on an identifiable ends such as build the atomic bomb or 
land on the moon. These projects were undertaken without commercialization in mind. Clean 
energy R&D, on the other hand, has multiple aims, uses a wide variety of technologies, and 
engages a wide variety of public and private actors.  
In addition to the country’s 17 national labs that contribute significantly to clean energy 
R&D, there are a variety of configurations of public-private partnerships that go under various 
headings including Energy Innovation Hubs and Energy Frontier Research Centers.  These DOE 
activities are engaged in basic science as well as technological development and, most importantly, 
commercial deployment. In short, the agency responsible for overseeing federal project, the 
Advanced Research Project Administration – Energy (ARPA-E), a part of DOE, reports successful 
investments in a wide variety of programs from energy storage to improve transportation systems 
and from improve grid operations through energy efficiency and clean power technologies.29 
Government R&D, as well as the facilitative role it plays in putting together public-private 
partnerships, is indispensable to the success of a clean energy transition.30  Importantly, federal 
investment in clean energy technologies helps private firms traduce the technological valley of 
death and the commercial valley of death. By lowering the risk of developing new science and 
technology, government investment supports private initiatives moving from proof of concept to 
demonstration and, thereby, overcoming the technological valley of death. Likewise, because 
public sector clean energy investments focus on developing new markets and on 
commercialization, government subsidies and financial supports can bridge the commercial valley 
of death often faced by private sector innovators.31   
                                                   
28 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF CLEAN ENERGY INVESTMENTS IN 
THE RECOVERY ACT (February 2016) available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160225_cea_final_clean_energy_report.pdf.  
29 DOE, ARPA-E, ARPA-E: THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS: A SAMPLING OF PROJECT OUTCOMES (May 17, 2016) 
available at https://arpa-e.energy.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/Volume%201_ARPA-
E_ImpactSheetCompilation_FINAL.pdf.  
30 JEFFREY D. SACHS, BUILDING THE NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY: SMART, FAIR & SUSTAINABLE ch. 11 (2017). 
31 JOSEPH P. TOMAIN. CLEAN POWER POLITICS: THE DEMO0CRATIZATION OF ENERGY ch. 4 (2017). 
 
8 
 
Therefore, for a successful transition to a clean energy future, there must be public and 
private sector alignment from R&D through commercialization. New clean energy investments 
are confronting a new future in which the energy and environmental sectors of the economy are 
not seen as separate spheres of behavior; rather, the physical reality of fuel cycle necessitates the 
bringing together of environmental and energy policies and activities. To the extent, then, that 
investments are directed to this new business reality, then new business models are necessary and 
they are developing as best seen with the utility of the future. 
 
II. The Utility of the Future 
 
The electric utility industry faces several challenges including: flattening demand; high-
priced incumbent-generated electricity; increased concern over environmental consequences of 
fossil fuel generation; grid defection; and, the market entry of cleaner and smaller energy 
technologies.32 In part, these new technologies can be defined as distributed energy resources 
(DER). Resources such as rooftop solar and micro-grids can generate electricity closer to the end 
users, at smaller scale, and with less harmful environmental consequences. 
 
A. The MIT Study  
 
According to some in the electric industry, these challenges threaten to put investor-owned 
utilities (IOUs) into a “death spiral.”33 More positively, however, the challenges have also 
generated a significant literature regarding the future of the electric utility. The Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology is now engaged in an international, comprehensive and multiyear Utility 
of the Future Study34 to “address the technology, policy, and business models shaping the evolution 
of the delivery of electric services.”35  While it is clear that IOUs will no longer dominate the 
electric sector, most observers take the position that they will continue to be central actors and that 
their ability to adapt to the new environment will be central to the success of the clean energy 
transition. 
 
                                                   
32 Inara Scott, Incentive Regulation, New Business Models, and the Transformation of the Electric Power Industry, 5 
MICH. J. ENVTL & ADMIN. L. 319 (2016).  
33 CITI, RISING SUN: IMPLICATIONS FOR US UTILITIES, 22, 26 (2013); PETER KIND, ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
ADVOCATES, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING 
RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 1 (2013) (both reports discuss the “death spiral” for electric utilities). For an analysis of 
the death spiral discussion, compare Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death 
Spiral for Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L. J. 1 (2014) with David Raskin, Getting Distributed Generation Right: A 
Response to “Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for Electric Utilities?,” 35 ENERGY L.J. 262 
(2014). See also Joseph P. Tomain, Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a Distributed Generation World, 
38 NOVA L. REV. 473 (2014). 
34 MIT, Utility of the Future Study homepage at https://mitei.mit.edu/research/utility-future-study.  
35 Id. 
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New business models are being designed with the intent of capturing producer and 
consumer value.36 In order to capture available economic surplus, power providers must have more 
reliable and responsive prices; two-way information flows between energy producers; move away 
from cost of service ratemaking; and encourage utilities to segregate their regulated and 
unregulated businesses. In other words, new forms of rate regulation will be applied to essential 
facilities and services that deliver electricity to the end-user.37 At the same time, utilities can be 
encouraged to develop other energy services such as conducting energy audits and demonstration 
projects, marketing energy savings appliances and the like. To the extent that those latter activities 
occur in competitive markets, then they can be removed from the regulated side of a utility’s books.  
 
Preliminarily, three observations must be made. First, not only must IOUs invest in 
technological innovation, they must also invest in business innovation. Second, because IOUs will 
continue to be regulated for the foreseeable future, the transition, as discussed in the next section, 
will not occur without associated regulations to support it.38 Regulations are necessary to protect 
past utility investments and regulations can help stimulate the transition through financial 
incentives and other legal supports.  
 
The third observation is that neither a business-as-usual approach nor a fully competitive 
retail electricity market will develop in the near-term.  The electricity future will have a wider 
range of providers and consumers will have more purchase options than they have had in the past. 
The future of the electric industry, then, is not the utility of the future, instead it is the power system 
of the future and it will be a cleaner future. 
 
Utility executives acknowledge that the expansion of vertically-integrated IOUs is 
unlikely.39   Nevertheless, even though IOUs will no longer dominate, a fully competitive electric 
industry at the wholesale and retail levels will not develop in the near-term if for no other reason 
than the fact that the grid is a necessary component to an electricity future and that grid, for the 
most part, was constructed by and is owned by incumbent IOUs.  As the three models discussed 
below indicate, although the future will be a mixed future of regulation and more competition, 
smart IOUs should be able to compete in these new and emerging markets. 
 
                                                   
36 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & ITT COMILLAS, THE MIT UTILITY OF THE FUTURE STUDY: 
WHITE PAPER  22 (December 2013).   
37 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE: AN MIT 
ENERGY INITIATIVE RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (2016); see also  SCOTT P. BURGER & MAX 
LIKE, BUSINESS MODELS FOR DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES: A REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (April 
2016). 
38 STEVEN NADEL & GARRETT HERNDON, THE FUTURE OF THE UTILITY INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY viii (June 2104); ELECTRICITY INNOVATION LAB ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, RATE DESIGNED 
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: ELECTRICITY PRICING FOR A DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE FUTURE 12-13 (August 
2014). 
39 UtilityDive Brand Studio, 2015 State of the Electric Utility: Survey Results 9 (2015). 
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The utility of the future must respond to three current and expanding trends. First, on the 
supply side, the cost of producing energy from renewable resources, most particularly wind and 
solar, continues to decline as grid parity is in sight. Another supply-side feature is that the scale of 
electric power production is shrinking as DER technologies proliferate.40  These distributed 
systems pose a direct threat to traditionally-structured IOUs.  Second, on the demand-side, while 
projected future demands are relatively flat, consumers are using electricity in different ways 
including charging vehicles, increasing storage, self-generation, and responding to demand 
response regulations. The third trend involves information and communication technologies (ICT) 
that radically reconfigure the traditional delivery of electricity.41 ICT systems of the future will 
have two-way information flows which, in turn, improve price signals in real time and can improve 
grid security and reliability.42  Each of these trends is transformative for traditional IOUs and each 
of these trends has the potential for improving customer control as well as industry competition.  
 
One way of conceptualizing the new utility model is that a utility’s primary business will 
be to focus on distribution and customer service rather than maintain a singular focus on 
generation.  The new utility’s primary business will be to serve as a grid operator in an environment 
of increased wholesale and retail competition.43  Innovative utilities will become more sensitive to 
customer needs and will be rewarded for it.44 Demand studies show, for example, that consumers 
are responding to price information and that they are reducing consumption at peak times.  In 
addition, behind the meter technologies such as home displays, programmable thermostats and 
other appliances together with social networking create a new environment as more information 
about energy use and price is available for providers and consumers. Providers can use that 
information to develop better business plans and consumers can use that information to better 
understand how to use energy more efficiently.45  
 
B. Three Business Models 
 
IOUs do not enter this new environment without substantial assets including the 
management of and experience in building and operating power plants. Through various regulatory 
                                                   
40 Richard Fioravanti, Energy Storage: Out of the Lab and Onto the Grid, 153 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 30 (April 2015). 
41 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & ITT COMILLAS, THE MIT UTILITY OF THE FUTURE STUDY 1 
(2014).  See also MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & ITT COMILLAS, THE MIT UTILITY OF THE 
FUTURE STUDY: WHITE PAPER (December 2013); Dave Grossman, Advancing Smart Electricity Networks: A 
Report of the First Aspen Institute Initiative on Smart Energy and Network Technologies (INSENT Roundtable 
(2013).    
42 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY at 7-10. 
43 Joseph Scalise, California Public Utilities Commission: the Business Model for the Electric Utility of the Future 
(October 8, 2013).  
44 Ahmad Faruqui & Eric Shultz, Demand Growth and the New Normal, 150 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 22 (December 2012);  
Bayless at 23. 
45 Paul Woods, The Social Utility, 150 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 40 (December 2012).  
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environments, they have adapted their services and their ability to balance load and deliver reliable 
and affordable electricity.  Today, not only is there a new regulatory environment, new 
technologies are coming on line that will enable traditional IOUs to adapt. Although there is no 
single conception, there are three prevalent models for the utility of the future – a wires only system 
operator, a smart integrator, or an energy services operator. 
 
 Wires Only.  It is an easy move for an IOU, particularly in deregulated jurisdictions, to 
separate business functions particularly generation from transmission and distribution and then run 
the transportation segments. To the extent that the traditional IOU divests generation assets, its 
ability to manage transmission and/or distribution makes it a “wires only” company.  
 
 A utility of the future can consider building and improving transmission as a profit center. 
The grid is in need of upgrade as well as improvement. The smart grid will incorporate new two-
way information technologies that will require greater expertise to operate. Further, as variable 
resources play a larger role in power generation, new transmission lines will be needed to connect 
wind and solar installations to the existing grid. Additionally, a wires only utility will serve a 
backup role for a variety of DER.46 
 
 Today, over half of the country’s electric consumers are served by regional organizations. 
RTO/ISOs manage capacity markets to ensure that enough electricity is available to serve demand.  
RTO/ISOs owns no assets instead, transmission lines continue to be owned by private utilities that 
agree to the terms for RTO/ISO participation as established by each regional organization together 
with FERC.  To keep the system in balance and operating reliably, there must be a clean interface 
between the transmission system operator (TSO) and the distribution system operator (DSO). The 
TSO will remain largely responsible for aggregating enough electric capacity to be sold to all 
customers and must maintain the high-voltage portion of the grid. The DSO will obtain power 
from the regional TSO, as well as other power providers, and will be responsible for satisfying 
customer demand and maintaining the reliability of the local grid. 
 
 The DSO, in contrast with the TSO, directly connects to end-users. The main task of the 
DSO is to “ensure that the distribution system can securely, efficiently, and economically distribute 
electricity to end-users.”47  The DSO is responsible for network infrastructure and will recoup its 
investments through sales of electricity and other services.  A wires-only DSO can be the central 
actor in gathering a growing portfolio of distributed and renewable energy and for coordinating 
electricity sales through TSOs.  
 
                                                   
46 UtilityDive at 5-6; Tom King, New Grids Now: Connecting America’s Energy Network to the 21st Century 
available at http://us.nationalgridconnecting.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Connect21_WhitePaper_high-res.pdf.  
47 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY at 31.   
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The DSO, because of its necessary connection with the TSO, will also use more 
sophisticated ICT to understand real-time pricing and customer usage keeping an eye on 
innovations that can improve the system for greater efficiency and reliability. The DSO, then, 
serves as a grid-connected firm that responds to the demand for electricity; provides energy storage 
and generation through the use of advanced metering controls and information technologies to the 
end of providing energy services at the local level;48 can serve as an aggregator for DER thus 
increasing system efficiencies;49 and can act as an integrator of distributed energy resources. 
 
Smart Integrator. The wires only TSO or DSO closely represent one segment of the 
traditional electric utility – transportation.  Another model of the utility of the future, the “smart 
integrator,” will be more diverse in its products and services while also operating in regulated as 
well as more competitive marketplaces. One hallmark of such a firm is that its revenue will be 
decoupled from electricity sales and it will be expected to fulfill energy efficiency and other 
environmental mandates.50 This firm will operate the local power grid through its mastery of ICT 
systems necessary to deliver electricity although the integrator will not generate its own power for 
sale.  Instead, the smart integrator will own and maintain the assets necessary for transmission and 
distribution improving those services as they collect information about consumer demand and 
other needs.51  
 
The primary business rationale for the smart integrator is to bring innovative technologies 
to the energy system in order to satisfy the multiple goals involved with a clean power future.  Its 
core competency, then, will be its mastery of ICT specifically designed for two-way 
communications.  In this regard, it must master an open architecture that is available to a variety 
of providers and consumers alike in order to optimize the availability of information to enrich 
consumer and producer choice. 
 
The smart integrator has also been described as a firm that creates partnerships between 
utilities and innovative energy firms for the purpose of bringing new technologies and services 
online through new business practices and processes.  While traditional utilities under this model 
would continue to either generate or transport electricity or both, the smart integrator will facilitate 
those transactions by: facilitating the adoption of the new regulatory regimes;  rationalizing 
interconnections between new technologies and the existing grid; integrating new generation into 
the system;52 and, providing back-up power. 
                                                   
48 IGNACIO PÉREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., FROM DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS SMART DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS: 
RETHINKING THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN DSOS: FINAL REPORT (June 2013).  
49 Scudder Parker & Frances Huessy, What’s a Utility to Do: Next-Generation Energy Services and a New 
Partnership to Serve Customers 3 (November 2013). 
50 UtilityDive at 10. 
51 Steven NADEL & GARRETT HERNDON, THE FUTURE OF THE UTILITY INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY 57 (June 2014). 
52 Ronald L. Lehr, New Utility Business Models: Utility and Regulatory Models for The Modern Era, ELECTRICITY 
J. 35, 43 (October 2013).. 
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Electric Services Operator.  The electric services operator (ESO) most closely resembles 
the traditional IOU.  The ESO will preserve and extend core capabilities of generating and 
delivering electricity, identify new technologies, and explore a variety of new business 
opportunities to succeed in the new market.53  The ESO retains aspects of vertical integration and 
its business is to provide electricity within a large service territory.  The principal responsibility of 
the ESO will be to provide low-cost, reliable energy services to its customers.54  While the ESO 
may own generation and other assets, it will also be required to open access and purchase or 
transmit power from a variety of providers.55   
 
The regulation and operation of an ESO will differ from that of the IOU insofar as the new 
services and products are properly priced and aligned with regulatory incentives; that a level 
playing field is constructed for DG and DER resources; and that enable the new utility to invest in 
a wide variety of new technologies and business opportunities.56   
 
The ESO will also have elements of the smart integrator insofar as it will be managing a 
more complex grid involving more actors. Consequently, it will be required to manage big data 
and engage in more sophisticated mid-and long-term planning. Further, the ESO will be tasked to 
meet other social policies including environmental and efficiency regulations that will reduce their 
sales revenues. Thus, an ESO and its regulators must develop a rate scheme that allows the new 
utility to move in both directions, that is sell electricity and “sell” efficiency and conservation.  
 
Additionally, ESOs will advance the use of DFG/DER and expand the use of variable 
energy resources either by building utility-scale solar and wind projects, owning their own 
distributed generation business units, and/or partnering with third-party vendors.57  In short, in 
ESU will make money through cost-competitive tariffs, reliable grid services, and financially 
attractive pricing for energy as well as for the provision of demand response and other services for 
customers.58 
 
What should be most clear from this brief description of industry trends and new models 
is that the utility of the future will not involve unilateral transactions in which electricity providers 
exist only to sell electricity to consumers who, in turn, pay for that electricity.  Rather, the future 
industry will involve a variety of two-way transactions in which traditional providers will also 
                                                   
53 NADEL & HERNDON at 48-50. 
54 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY at 35.   
55 PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID OF THE FUTURE ELECTRIC UTILITIES 
189 (2010). 
56 ELECTRICITY INNOVATION LAB ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, RATE DESIGN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION EDGE: 
ELECTRICITY PRICING FOR A DISTRIBUTED RESOURCE FUTURE 13 (August 2014). 
57 UtilityDive at 17-18. 
58 Owen Zinaman et al., Power Systems of the Future: The 21st Century Power Partnership Thought Leadership 
Report 23 (February 2015). 
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purchase energy services from traditional consumers that pay for the electricity they consume but 
also sell energy and services, such as storage, to those same providers.  Thus, “the challenge for 
incumbent utilities is to find innovative ways to retain the value proposition of their assets while 
capturing the opportunities presented by [distributed energy systems] and their component 
technologies.”59   
 
Another way to frame the issue regarding the utility of the future is to acknowledge that 
IOUs cannot depend upon regulators to satisfy all of their revenue requirements.  Instead, the utility 
of the future is better understood as an electricity system comprised of multiple actors within 
multiple regulated and non-regulated markets.  Tomorrow’s electric industry will be comprised of 
a wider variety of providers at different scales, generating electricity from different resources and 
in more competitive environments. Moreover, this new array of providers, by competitive 
necessity and with a desire for market share, will necessarily pay greater attention to consumer 
interests in energy services as well as their demand for power.  Additionally, the system of the 
future is, and will continue to be, driven by technological changes, business value opportunities 
and, most importantly, supporting regulatory initiatives as explained in more depth in the next 
section. 
 
 
III. Clean Energy Regulations  
The Trump administration’s hostility to clean energy programming does not foreclose the 
transition to a clean future.  The public sector at the regional, state, and local levels are actively 
involved with the transition and are adopting new sets of regulations further advancing clean 
energy goals. This section will discuss those initiatives in two parts. First, an array of state 
initiatives will be discussed. And, second, we will look in depth at one statewide initiative designed 
to reconfigure the electric industry within that jurisdiction. 
A. State Clean Energy Initiatives. 
State governments of been involved promoting clean energy for decades now. The 
following is a list of those initiatives that are transforming the energy sector by encouraging the 
development and utilization of renewable resources and efficiency; opening an operating new and 
more competitive energy markets; and by providing consumers with additional energy choices. 
 
1. Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
                                                   
59 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY at 13. 
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Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) have been adopted by 41 states and the District of 
Columbia60 and cover over 50% of total US electric demand.61 The intended purposes include: 
increasing the amount of clean power that is used to generate electricity; reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions; promoting technological energy innovations; and creating new and more competitive 
energy markets.  An RPS can be defined as “a regulatory mandate to increase production of energy 
from renewable sources such as wind, solar, biomass and other alternatives to fossil fuels and 
nuclear electric generation.”62 This general definition does not convey the complexity and variety 
of RPS programs.  Of the various state programs, for example, 29 have mandatory programs while 
the others are voluntary. With voluntary programs, the states set specific goals; however, there is 
no penalty for failure to achieve them. 
 
There are two basic requirements behind a typical RPS program. First, the state regulator 
will require identified utilities (usually local IOUs) to generate a certain percentage of electricity 
from specific natural resources.  The utility, then, will be required to purchase that percentage from 
qualifying providers or the regulated utility can purchase renewable energy credits to satisfy its 
RPS obligations.63 
 
The second requirement is that the percentage goal will be set according to a published 
schedule.  By way of example, a state may require that a utility purchase 3% renewable energy 
beginning in 2012 and increasing to 20% by 2020.  Some RPS programs also allow utilities to 
satisfy their clean energy obligations through the adoption of conservation or energy efficiency 
programs.64  
 
Because energy resources are unevenly distributed across the country, different states 
emphasize different resources in their RPS programs.  States in the Pacific Northwest and states 
in New England, as an example, have more access to relatively inexpensive hydroelectric power 
than other states in the country. The state of Maine, for example, adopted a very aggressive 30% 
RPS goal.  However, because eligible resources included existing hydroelectric and biomass power 
plants, Maine utilities satisfy the 30% requirement on the effective date that the RPS program was 
launched.  Similarly, states in the Southwest have more access to wind and solar power than 
                                                   
60 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Renewable and Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards available at 
http://www.c2es.org/node/9340; DSIRE & NC Cclean Energy Technology Center, Database of State Incentives for 
Renewables & Efficiency available at http://www.dsireusa.org/.  
61 Union of Concerned Scientists, How Renewable Electricity Standards Deliver Economic Benefits 3 (May 2013). 
62 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technology Deployment: State & Local Governments: Renewable 
Portfolio Standards  available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_portfolio_standards.html.  
63 Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVT’L L. 931, 956-57 (2009). 
64 Joshua P. Fershee, Renewable Mandates and Goals in MICHAEL B. GERRARD (ed.), THE LAW OF CLEAN 
ENERGY 77 (2011).  
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northern states and Southeastern states have stronger potential for the development of biomass and 
less so for solar and wind power.65   
 
Moreover, the various states differ on what constitutes an eligible resource.  Some states, 
for example, include clean coal which is defined as coal-fired plants that captures and stores carbon 
dioxide emissions. Further, some state RPS requirements attempt to achieve other goals such as 
promote in-state renewable resources. And, as described below, special programs have been set up 
protect existing nuclear power plants. 
 
To date, there is no national RPS program. The arguments in favor such a program include: 
(1) a clear understanding of what constitutes clean power; (2) an increase in the amount of clean 
power that is required to be provided; (3) the creation of a national market for renewable energy 
credits; (4) increased efficiency by electricity suppliers; (5) rationalization of utility practices i.e. 
utilities satisfy the national standard rather than individual state standards; (6) more uniform and 
reliable enforcement; and, (7) an alignment of energy and environmental regulations.66  A national 
RPS should smooth out markets and bring consistency to eligible resources as well as consistency 
in monitoring and enforcement. While the current political climate does not favor a national RPS 
program, such a program does come with other political costs.   
 
Renewable power is often more expensive than traditional energy sources, therefore, there 
is a political reluctance to impose higher costs on consumers.  Second, as noted above, the uneven 
distribution of energy resources and the varied mix of power plants within each state make regional 
application of RPS programs attractive.67  Further, because of the uneven distribution of resources, 
questions arise as to the distribution of the cost burdens associated with such programs.68   
 
2. Feed-in Tariffs 
 
A feed-in-tariff (FIT) has the same goal as an RPS program, which is to increase the 
percentage of electricity generated from low-carbon resources. A FIT operates differently.  With 
a FIT there is a contract between a utility and a renewable energy developer. The contract sets a 
certain rate for the electricity purchased from the developer for a specific period of time.  Through 
long-term contracts, new energy providers can rely on an income stream and utilities can use those 
contracts to satisfy state requirements. 
 
                                                   
65 Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1431 (2010). 
66 Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN L. REV. 1339 (2010). See also 
Fershee at 84-86. 
67 David B. Spence, The Political Barriers to a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1451 (2010). 
68 Rossi at 1433-36. 
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FITs have been more widely developed in Europe than in the United States.69  FITs can be 
used for the purpose of expanding renewable technologies ranging from wind and solar to 
geothermal and biomass to fuel cells and tidal power.  There are several benefits associated with 
FIT programs.  First, clean energy resources displace fossil fuels thus reducing carbon emissions. 
Second, the fixed prices can stabilize electricity rates. Third, because clean energy developers can 
rely on an income stream, economic development and job creation can occur.  Fourth, clean power 
initiatives can contribute to economic growth. Even so, such programs have been controversial 
particularly in Germany and Spain. 
 
Although Germany is notable for its widespread adoption of FIT programs, the German 
experience was not problem free because electricity rates were higher than anticipated leading 
some critics to argue that the program failed.  Regardless of higher rates, however, corrections can 
be made to pricing and the German goal of increasing solar penetration can be and is being met as 
solar penetration exceeded expectations.  Originally, the program was expected to represent about 
7% of total German wholesale generation. In 2014, however, solar power was close to 20% of 
installed capacity and close to 50% of peak demand.70 
 
In Spain a solar FIT program was designed to provide guaranteed income to power 
suppliers but it also put a ceiling on retail rates. As a consequence, of constraining prices, its FIT 
program failed.71  Again, the challenge lies in program design.72  
 
In the United States, although FIT programs include a variety of renewable technologies, 
they all generally include solar photovoltaic (PV). In Virginia, for example, the FIT applies only 
to residential consumers who have installed solar PV while Hawaii’s and California’s FIT 
regulations apply to all investor-owned utilities.  In each case, the FIT specifies a rate and a 
contract period usually 10 to 20 years.73  
 
States can adopt either RPS or FIT programs or both and the programs can be seen as 
complementary to each other.74  RPSs are intended to achieve a certain quantity of electricity that 
is generated by renewable resources (or efficiency.)  FITs, by contrast, focus on cost and creating 
                                                   
69 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Technology Deployment: State & Local Governments: Feed-In Tariffs 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/tech_deployment/state_local_governments/basics_tariffs.html.   
70 JURGEN WEISS, SOLAR ENERGY SUPPORT IN GERMANY: A CLOSER LOOK (July 2014) (a report from the Brattle 
Group prepared for Solar Energy Industries Association). 
71 Craig Morris, Spanish Feed-In Tariffs—A Wrapup, (July 22, 2013) available at 
http://www.renewablesinternational.net/spanish-feed-in-tariffs-a-wrapup/150/537/71424/.  
72 TOBY D. COUTURE ET AL., A POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY DESIGN (July 2010)(a report 
for the National Renewable Energy laboratory). 
73 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Feed-in Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable 
Electricity Technologies (May 30, 2013) available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11471 and 
Electricity Feed-In Tariffs and Similar Programs (June 4, 2013) available at 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/provider_programs.cfm.   
74 Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015). 
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clean power markets.  Both programs can be seen as promoting technological innovation in order 
to satisfy clean energy standards.75 In short, the RPS sets the goal and the FIT is the primary 
method for achieving it.  By combining both regulatory tools, a larger clean power market is 
created simultaneously interacting with utilities and emerging clean power providers.  Second, 
energy planning should be more comprehensive.  Third, both programs should reinforce each other 
thus making the attainment of clean power goals more likely.  Finally, the use of these tools 
provides public support for a clean power transition.76 
 
3. Clean Energy Standards  and Zero Emission Credits 
 
 Legislation at the state and federal levels has focused on energy efficiency and resource 
conservation.  It is important to distinguish between the two. In a real sense, only resource 
conservation is truly carbon zero while energy efficiency will have some carbon effects through 
the manufacturing processes needed for energy efficient appliances buildings and other 
technologies.   
 
Clean energy standards (CES) and energy efficiency standards (EES) are regularly 
considered to reduce energy demand. A CES is a requirement imposed upon a utility, similar to an 
RPS program, which requires utilities to reduce electricity (and/or natural gas) usage by a certain 
percentage by a certain date.  
  
CES programs can be used to require utilities to invest in energy efficiency programs to 
reduce energy usage by consumers.  The utility, in turn, would recover that investment from 
ratepayers. Together with either an RPS or FIT program, the CES can have two direct effects. 
First, investment decisions should be driven to clean energy technologies. Second, efficiency goals 
should lower total energy costs to the consumer.77   
 
According to an Energy Information Administration report, a national CES would have the 
effect of “significantly reducing the role of coal-fired generation, while increasing the role of 
nuclear, natural gas, and non-hydropower renewable technologies.”  Further, such programming 
is expected to result in a 25% decrease in coal-fired generation by 2025 and a 54% decrease by 
2035.”78 Concomitantly, the EIA projected that non-hydroelectric renewable generation would 
increase significantly by 42% in 2025 and 34% in 2035 with wind and biomass exhibiting largest 
                                                   
75 Lincoln L, Davies, Reconciling Renewable Portfolio Standards and Feed-In Tariffs, 32 UTAH ENVT. L. REV. 
311 (2012). 
76 Davies, Reconciling at 314.  
77 Energy Future Coalition, Comments by the Energy Future Coalition: Key Elements for Clean Energy Standard 
Proposals 5 (2011). 
78 US Energy Information Administration, Analysis & Projections: Analysis of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 
2012 2 (May 2, 2012).   
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increases. Further, carbon dioxide emissions were estimated to fall 20% by 2025 and 44% by 
2035.79 
 
A comprehensive CES should include energy efficiency for two reasons. First, “improving 
energy productivity is by far the lowest-cost, largest, quickest, and cleanest way to meet clean 
energy goals.”80 Second, efficiency gains reduce carbon emissions.81  Reports by the National 
Academy of Sciences, McKinsey and Company, and the American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy all demonstrate that efficiency gains not only remain to be made but can 
promote economic growth by reducing waste.82  
 
Zero emission credits (ZECs) area device first adopted by New York state for the express 
purpose of financially supporting existing nuclear power plants buy delaying their closures. The 
idea is basic and simple: because nuclear power plants emit zero carbon, therefore, they should be 
paid for doing it. While it is debatable whether or not nuclear power should play a role in a clean 
energy future,83 ZECs are an economically perverse way of doing so. While RPSs and FITs are 
designed to encourage the entry of clean energy products and resources into the market, nuclear 
power plants (already heavily subsidized) have been in the market for decades and have recovered 
their capital outlays.  Nuclear power plants are initially license 40 years believing that that extent 
of their useful lives. The nuclear meltdown in the United States, now, has lasted for over 40 years 
and, therefore, plants are coming up for license renewals. ZEC markets quite simply reward 
incumbents and do nothing to open new clean markets. 
 
4. Specific Programs for  Vehicles, Buildings and Appliances 
 
                                                   
79 US Energy Information Administration, Analysis & Projections at 3-4.  See also Anthony Paul, Karen Palmer & 
Matt Woerman, Designing by Degrees: Flexibility and Cost-Effectiveness in Climate Policy (February 2014) 
(arguing that the CES should be recalibrated to achieve higher efficiencies then as designed in the proposed 
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80 Energy Future Coalition at 2.  
81 US ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011 12 (September 2012); 
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 16 (December 2014). 
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with Doug Kaplow, Nuclear Power: Still Not viable Without Subsidies (2011) available at  
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nuclear_power/nuclear_subsidies_report.pdf.    
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In response to the energy crises of 1973, legislation was passed to increase US energy 
independence including legislation to increase energy efficiency in vehicles,84 appliances,85 
equipment, 86 and buildings. 87 This legislation continued into the 21st century.88  
 
The CAFE standards for vehicles began in 1975 at 18.0 miles per gallon (mpg), and during 
the Obama administration, through negotiations with car manufacturers, they have been raised  to 
54.5 for cars and light-duty trucks by model year 2025.89 A goal now threatened by the Trump 
administration.90 
 
Appliance standards work similarly.  The Department of Energy established procedures for 
determining standards of energy efficiency, energy use, and estimated cost for identified products.  
And, the Federal Trade Commission was required to adopt labeling rules based upon that 
information.  Labeling provides consumers with information about energy savings.  
  
Programs such as Energy Star and LEED labels have been popular as well as successful.  
In 2009, Energy Star prevented 45 million metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions, the equivalent 
of emissions from 30 million vehicles.  The program has reduced energy consumption and has 
saved consumers $17 billion in their utility bills.91  
  
It has been estimated by the EPA that Energy Star and similar programs have resulted in 
$19 billion in cost savings to consumers in 2009 alone.92  Similarly, according to the EPA, from 
1992 through 2013, Energy Star participants through investments in energy efficient technologies 
and practices have reduced utility bills by $30 billion and have prevented more than 277 million 
metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 alone thus providing over $10 billion in social 
benefits by reducing damages from climate change.93  The agency also reports that Energy Star 
                                                   
84 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163 (1975). 
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4, 429 billion kWh and cumulative CO2 reduction  through 2030 of 2,165 million metric tons. 
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has certified over 4.8 billion products and more than 1.5 million households have earned the 
Energy Star label since the program began. 94 
 
Similarly, improved energy efficiency in buildings, which account for 40% of US carbon 
emissions, can have a significant impact on emissions reductions.95  Today, the most popular effort 
to promote the development of green buildings is the voluntary U.S. Green Building Council’s 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program.  Several states and 
municipalities require that all state government buildings meet LEED criteria.96  It is been 
estimated that if these practices are applied to all new buildings in the United States, then projected 
CO2 emissions could be reduced by over 10% by 2030.  
 
5. Renegotiating the Regulatory Compact 
 
For over a century, electricity rates have been set based upon some form of cost-of-service 
(COS). The COS formula provided incentives commit capital more buildings and equipment and, 
therefore, contributed to inefficient overcapacity.  Even though new rate schemes have been 
available, public utility commissions (PUCs) have been reluctant to abandon COS ratemaking 
largely at the behest utilities themselves. 
 
Today, as the electric industry faces new challenges and with the push to decarbonized the 
electricity system, industry and its regulators must rethink their relationship. We can begin by 
making certain assumptions about the electricity future including: (1) large-scale central power 
stations will continue to be important generators although on a diminishing scale; (2) an increasing 
number of non-IOU power providers are part of a more competitive electricity market; (3) the 
transportation and distribution segments of the industry will continue to be regulated as long as 
they exhibit natural monopoly characteristics; (4) IOUs can no longer be devoted exclusively to 
electricity sales; instead, they must provide a wider array of energy services and products including 
renewable resources and energy efficiency; and (5) because IOUs will continue to be regulated, a 
new regulatory compact must be renegotiated based upon a new set of regulatory principles such 
as the following.97 
 
Stranded Costs.  Utilities should not be put in a position of incurring excess costs that, due 
to regulatory or policy changes, may become stranded and generate little or no electricity. Yet, the 
stranded costs problem is a two-edged sword.  On the one hand, investors should not be deprived 
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of a return on their investments due to regulatory or policy changes that they could not anticipate; 
therefore, prudent investments that result in stranded costs should be afforded an opportunity to 
earn a return. 98  On the other hand, consumers should not pay for investments that yield either no 
or expensive of electricity.  As contemporary energy policy changes, the problem of stranded costs 
should be anticipated and, if possible, avoided.99  
 Legacy Financing.  Regulators should avoid legacy financing.  Traditionally structured 
utilities should not continue to be rewarded as they have in the past if they take a business as usual 
path.  Any argument that utilities should continue to earn the same revenue because demand is 
down, it is not sound. Decreased demand alone is no cause for continuing to allow a regulated firm 
to earn a return on unproductive investments.100  No utility has any legal claim to continue to 
maintain its revenue requirement just because it loses sales.   
COS ratemaking had its place, nevertheless, it should not be used to allow utilities to 
continue to build dirty coal-fired plants nor should it be used to reward utilities for embarking on 
financially risky nuclear projects.101  As solar, wind, and natural gas generated electricity show 
increasingly positive cost signals, continued investments in coal and nuclear power will be viewed 
skeptically. Instead, of maintaining the status quo, regulators must manage the changing role of 
IOUs and encourage innovation in their business models.102 
Equity.  The new regulatory compact should encourage, rather than inhibit, competition 
and the development of innovative energy technologies including sales reducing technologies such 
as DER.103  DER is becoming an increasingly important actor in electricity markets and it has the 
potential for unfair cross-subsidization. Consequently, regulators must be careful to ensure that 
non-DER customers do not pay more than their fair share of the remaining fixed costs.  To the 
extent that net metering rates generate an unfair cross-subsidization, then they should be 
changed.104  However, net metering benefits must also be accounted for in rates.105  Further, 
regulators must be careful to avoid designing net metering rates that slow DER penetration. The 
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smart utility will become actively involved with DER as well as with the development of utility-
scale solar wind and other renewable projects.106 
Universal Service, Reliability, & Re4silience. Regulators must be attentive to maintaining 
universal electric service. Similarly, regulators must assure energy/electricity reliability as well as 
system resilience.107 For most consumers, however they will need firm service and grid connection 
for back-up power.  An increase in electricity providers does have the potential for bringing 
significant benefits to utility service including: reduced load; greater reliability through reduced 
congestion; better balancing; and lower cybersecurity risks.   
Mitigation.   Since IOUs are well aware of the political economy of a changing energy 
market, they must avoid incurring expenditures based upon past assumptions in an effort to 
mitigate damages as is required by any contract. New Hampshire, for example, passed legislation 
intended to introduce competition into retail electric markets.  Regulators recognized the 
possibility that utilities had invested in the old regulatory regime and, therefore, made provisions 
that would allow a utility to recover it stranded costs if they were prudently incurred.  New 
Hampshire took an aggressive approach regarding mitigation efforts that a utility should undertake. 
Those steps included, among other efforts, the sale of excess generating capacity and the 
renegotiation of service contracts.108 
6. Ratemaking Reforms 
By adopting these principles a new regulatory compact can be designed and with it new 
ratemaking practices.  Fortunately, there is no shortage of new rate designs109 including (1) 
performance-based ratemaking;110 (2) incentive rates;111 (3) alternative regulation;112 (4) market-
based rates; 113 (5) decoupling;114 (6) feed-in-tariffs;115 and, (7) results-based regulation as 
examples.116  In choosing among new rate designs, regulators must address the changing 
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environment including the development of new technologies and new energy markets.117  Rates, 
then should be seen as a “means by which energy companies communicate their value proposition 
to their customers, and not merely the process by which they collect revenues.”118  Thus, while a 
wide variety of approaches can be adopted, any rate design should be based upon a set of new 
functions.   
Costs. While cost recovery will play a role in any new rate design,119 a move away from 
using historically embedded costs, or even future tests year costs, as the central element of a 
utility’s revenue requirement must be adopted.  A key move away from cost-based ratemaking is 
decoupling.  At its simplest form, decoupling means that rates will not be based on the volume of 
electricity sales, instead, rates will be based on other indicators such as the number of customers 
served.  
Innovation and Transition. Rate designs can promote innovation and assist in the clean 
power transition by allowing utilities to recover investments in innovation, energy efficiency, or 
renewable resources. Smart grid investments and pilot project costs should be recouped, as 
examples. Similarly, investments in smart meters, energy savings appliances, energy audits and 
the like should be encouraged and included in a utility’s revenue requirement.  Regulators, of 
course, will have a great degree of discretion.  Some investments can be included in the rate base 
and can earn a return for shareholders. Other investments can be treated as costs and recouped 
dollar-for-dollar.  
Cost-sharing. Cost-sharing can incentivize utilities to earn savings that can then be shared 
with customers.  Again, regulators will have discretion on the proportion of cost-sharing between 
the parties, but the idea is to create incentives for innovation  and efficiency.120  A smart rate design 
may require hybrid pricing models that apply to different investments, different expenses or to 
different customer classes.  Electricity rates, then, can be unbundled for different purposes such as 
for reliability, standby power, a certain level of service quality, and ancillary power services.121  
Smart rate designs “may ultimately create a nimble system that pays for required services, 
maximizes value, and allows for effective implementation.”122  The core idea behind moving away 
from COS to rate designs that are more sensitive to the market and to technological developments 
is to encourage competition and enable utilities to capitalize on new opportunities.123 
Balance of Interests. Shareholders, naturally, will only invest if they earn a reasonable 
return on their investment. That return must be comparable with investments of similar risk. Still, 
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shareholders do take on some investment risk and they should not be guaranteed a return at the 
expense of customers who may receive little or no benefit.  The trick lies in clearly identifying the 
risks to shareholders as well as the costs and benefits to consumers.  Rates should send clear price 
signals that account for both fixed and variable costs;124 avoid cross-subsidization as much as 
possible;125 and, represent the value of services provided to the customer by the utility. 126  
“Building a shared understanding among stakeholders and regulators in the electricity sector about 
the full range of costs and benefits of distributed energy resources and the implications of net 
energy metering is an essential first step toward devising rates and incentives that will create the 
greatest benefit for all.”127 
Prudence and Need Reviews. Prudence reviews became a matter of concern to utilities with 
the collapse of nuclear power. The possibility of a prudence review constitutes a risk to investors; 
however, all risk cannot and should not be eliminated. The fact that utility’s capital investment 
will be reviewed for prudence should be considered simply a matter of bringing business discipline 
into the electricity market.  A prudence review should work hand-in-hand with the obligation of a 
utility to mitigate the costs of unwise investments.  In that regard, then, two reviews should be 
considered. 
First, an ex ante a prudence review should occur at the time a utility wants to include 
specific investments in the rate base as part of a rate hearing or negotiated settlement.  After the 
rates have gone into effect, then a second, ex post, prudence review can be done to determine the 
goals have been satisfied. In this review, additional allowances or disallowances is can be made.  
Market Power.  Finally, regulators will be called upon to exercise an additional review of 
rates to ensure that utilities are not unfairly exercising their market power.  The emergence of more 
competition in the electric industry and the development of utility business models which 
encourage them to participate in those markets by, for example, selling energy services and 
products that are also being sold by third parties, may present market power problems. As an 
incumbent, a utility will have a leg up with customers and will have more experience. The larger 
problem, however, is that because utilities will be receiving government protected rates, they 
should not be able to favor the competitive arms of their businesses through those rates.  Utilities 
should not be in a position to exercise market power on the competitive side of their businesses 
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nor should they be able to engage in market manipulation128 certainly of the sort experienced 
during the Enron scandal by manipulating the way that rates are constructed.129 
Such review is a form of antitrust analysis. Regulators must carefully assess whether or not 
the incumbent utility has an unfair advantage due to its regulated status in certain competitive 
markets.130  More particularly, third-parties that sell energy products and services should be able 
to operate on a level playing field and utilities should not be able to reduce their financial risk in 
those markets through rate protection.  Therefore, regulators must examine rates to ensure that 
they do not facilitate the exercise of market power in those more competitive markets.  
Clearly, states of been actively involved in renegotiating the regulatory compact and 
considering and adopting new methods of rate make. The above examples of principles, however, 
are mostly one-off reforms. More ambitious state-wide reforms are being undertaken as next 
described. 
B. State-wide Industry Restructuring 
 
While other states, such as Minnesota131 and Maryland132 have examined the possibility of 
revamping the electric industry within those states, New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision 
(REV) project, by contrast, is notably and importantly more ambitious. Announced in a 
Framework Order of the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) in February 2015, REV 
proposes to dramatically restructure the electric industry in the state133 and serve as a model for 
the nation.134    The REV statement of purpose favors approaches that the electric system must be 
more consumer friendly, incorporate new technologies, and integrate new resources.  135 The 
program promises to transform the distribution system through a partnership with major IOUs and 
two large municipal utilities.  More specifically, the REV vision is to establish markets in which 
customers and non-utility third parties are active participants in system design and operation.136 
 
The Framework Order is a fundamental reconsideration of the existing regulatory structure, 
distribution utilities, emerging energy markets, and clean energy policy goals. Objectives include 
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increasing customer participation; providing for resource diversity; and maintaining system 
reliability and resilience among other objectives.  Additionally, the report acknowledged the 
drivers that were changing the electricity system such as an aging infrastructure, the need for 
modernization and the incorporation of new technologies, greater consumer participation and the 
need to reduce carbon emissions.137  In adopting the REV report, the Public Service Commission 
(PSC) emphasized the growing importance of ICT to provide more accurate data, enhance 
cybersecurity, expand customer choice, and improve reliability, power quality, and resilience.138 
 
Most significantly, the report recognized that the traditional COS paradigm was inadequate 
to efficiently address the expansion of clean energy, energy efficiency, and new technologies.  
Consequently, at the heart of the REV project is regulatory and business model innovation on a 
broader scale than seen before.  In addition to smooth interoperability of distribution systems and 
wholesale markets, the REV report concentrates on three areas: (1) the distribution system; (2) 
customer participation; and, (3) regulatory reform.  
 
 Distribution System. The central actor in the REV’s future power system is the Distributed 
System Platform Provider (DSP) that will be designated to coordinate a multiplicity of power 
providers, consumer activities, and DER within a particular service area.  The DSP will most likely 
operate under the management of existing utilities.  Like many other states, New York has adopted 
measures to achieve clean power goals including performance-based rates, decoupling, energy 
efficiency programs, innovative R&D programs, and other activities including a Green Bank 139 to 
help finance alternative energy projects. Although, these various tools are uncoordinated and 
efficiencies remain to be gained, they position the state well for more comprehensive 
programming.140 
 
 The DSP is intended to modernize, plan, design and operate the state’s distribution 
system141 and, in effect, becomes the utility of the future.  Thus, the DSP serves as a platform for 
bringing together the growing number of participants in the electric system on both sides of the 
meter. Proper planning should lead to intelligent integration of all actors, operational efficiencies, 
the adaptation technological innovations, and the development of ICT, as well as the satisfaction 
of public policy goals of expanding the use of DER and clean power reliably and affordably. 
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 The PSC ruled that incumbent utilities should serve as DSPs142 arguing that they were best 
situated for realizing the economic value, particularly from DER.  REV recognized that incumbent 
distribution utilities have decades of experience in planning, construction, monitoring, and 
balancing the electric system.  Consequently, a DSP that operates independently from established 
IOUs may incur wasteful and redundant learning curve costs and may operate inefficiently. 
Additionally, incumbent utilities regularly interact with the bulk power market as regulated by the 
New York ISO and, therefore, can more efficiently coordinate and integrate transmission and 
distribution services. 
 
 Customer Participation. The traditional one-way system in which IOUs sold electricity to 
consumers must be abandoned in favor of the two-way system discussed throughout this chapter 
that involves the flow of energy and information between producers and consumers. Consumers 
must be active participants in the design and operation of New York’s new distribution system. 
More particularly, the REV report focuses on the products, information and communications 
systems, and enabling technologies available in the new electricity market that will enable 
traditional consumers to take on a new role as prosumers of energy and ancillary services.143 In 
order to effectively enhance consumer participation, the new framework will require more 
intelligent use of consumer and system data particularly concerning price and product transparency 
and consistency.144  
 
All consumers are not alike. The needs and resources of small residential consumers are 
significantly different than those of large industrial, commercial and manufacturing concerns. 
Large consumers, for example, currently avail themselves of products offered by energy services 
companies. Such companies can conduct audits, provide a portfolio of services and technologies, 
and can help those consumers realize efficiencies. Small consumers should also have access to 
affordable energy services and resources. By way of examples, an energy service company could 
provide small consumers with metering retrofit services, wireless HVAC controls, diagnostic 
sensors, controllable Wi-Fi thermostats, desktop dashboard alerts and financial business incentives 
among others. Under the New York plan, as well as the plans in Minnesota Maryland, consumer 
input is a necessary element in constructing the new electricity system. 
 
Regulatory Reform.  Regarding regulatory reforms, REV first recognized the inadequacy 
of traditional COS ratemaking specifically because it incentivized electricity sales and not utility 
performance.  Further, the COS method is inconsistent with utilities acting as platform providers 
serving multi-participant markets as intended by the the DSP model that is intended to capture 
network benefits.145   The report then goes on to recognize that New York had shifted to negotiated 
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multi-year rate cases with the goal of providing opportunities for utilities to improve performance 
and, on occasion, provide for sharing earnings from efficiency gains with customers.146  The New 
York PSC has also employed other mechanisms to adjust rates when necessary, decouple rates, 
and other performance measures.  
 
The report recommended consideration of several changes to traditional ratemaking 
including long term rate plans, up to eight years, that would allow utilities more planning time and 
should reduce the number of contentious rate cases.147  With a longer term plan, utilities should be 
able to take greater advantage of innovations and managers should be able to concentrate on 
performance and customers rather than on cost savings from internal operations. 
 
Ratemaking should focus on performance rather than on a utility’s internal costs. Even 
under some performance-based rates,148 a utility can increase profits by performing better on 
internal budgets than the rate allows.  While such a measure improves a utility’s efficiency, under 
the traditional formula efficiency gains did not necessarily flow to customers. Therefore, rather 
than basing rates on the utility’s costs, rates should be based upon how well a utility satisfies new 
functions such as improving customer information, operational resilience, integration of renewable 
resources, and carbon reduction.  The idea behind such performance measures is to add value to 
customers as well as to the utility. Such a ratemaking focus, in effect, asks utilities to operate more 
like competitive firms rather than profit-protected firms.  The need for better performance rather 
than for more sales is especially necessary in DER markets.149 It should be noted that the 
recommendation does acknowledge that the utility service obligation will necessitate some 
financial protection through rates. 
 
The REV report recognized that undergirding the adoption of any new ratemaking 
mechanism will be a set of principles (similar to those set out above) to guide regulators in 
choosing the proper tool and matching it with an articulated public policy.  Above all, the system 
will be required to provide affordable universal energy service.  
  
Subsequent to the Framework Order, PSC staff issued a detailed White Paper that 
addressed regulatory reforms and changes in utility business models.   Specifically, the staff found 
that hardware and software innovations could provide utilities with flexibility that could reduce 
their costs as well as increase the value of DER.  These cost savings and increased values could 
improve how utilities meet their service obligations while capturing the value of third-party and 
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customer generated energy resources. Further, these innovations could lead to the development of 
the smart grid and improve reliability, resiliency, and total system value150 including value to 
IOUs.151  Thus, in order to gain these efficiencies, the staff recommended a comprehensive 
ratemaking reform, which, in turn, would lead to the new utility business models. 
  
Regarding ratemaking, the White Paper recommended dramatic change. Traditional 
ratemaking was simply about allocating historic costs to customer classes. Under REV, however, 
rate designs should work to lower total cost through more accurate price signals.152  The paper 
recognizes that there is no single formula to achieve that end.  Instead, a variety of tools including 
net metering, distributed resources tariffs, market-based mechanisms, stand-by rates, demand 
charges,153 smart home rates, and time-of-use rates, among others will be necessary in order to 
assess and value an electric system that effectively incorporates DER.154 In addition, New York 
has also adopted a set of clean energy standards and zero energy credits to reach a goal that 50% 
of the electricity consumed in the state will be generated by renewable resources by 2030 as a 
statewide strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by the same year.155 
 
The comprehensive reforms envisioned by the staff would be based upon two ideas.  First, 
ratemaking must allow utilities to earn a fair return on investments and must encourage the 
integration and deployment of DER.  In brief, the business model reforms are intended to 
encourage traditional IOUs to become utilities of the future whose business is the delivery of 
energy and efficiency through DER not only the sale of electricity.156  Second, the utility of the 
future will operate in a more competitive environment.157 
 
The PSC concluded that the REV would put New York’s electric industry “on a sustainable 
path to controlling customer bills and increasing system efficiency.”158  Further, the PSC recognize 
that traditional utility service and regulation were not sustainable because it presented greater costs 
and uncertainties.  Further, the PSC acknowledged that current market and technological trends 
have changed the electricity world.  In New York, a detailed cost-benefit analysis will be 
undertaken and implemented through additional processes that included the input from various 
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stakeholders. The REV is an ambitious starting point for the regulatory and market transformation 
of electric distribution not only in the state but in the nation. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper began with the observation that the antipathy clean energy shown by the Trump 
administration effectively removes federal government from a leadership role to a clean power 
future. Regardless, the transition is actively ongoing;159 clean energy technologies and markets are 
developing; utilities are experimenting with new business models; and regulators are adopting 
reforms that encourage and support this transition. While federal leadership would be a boon for 
clean energy, there are other public and private sector actors on stage. 
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